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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in a position whereby he has any powers over insurance polices on his
life capable of being exercised for his own benefit. Thus, in order to avoid
the Fruehauf tax trap the estate planner must provide for two trusts-
one containing only the insurance policies, over which the surviving
spouse should have no powers in the nature of "incidents of ownership ;,,"1
the other containing noninsurance assets, over which the surviving spouse
may safely act as trustee. Additionally, Fruehauf indicates that should the
surviving spouse act as executor, he must be expressly prohibited from
exercising any powers in the nature of "incidents of ownership" over in-
surance policies on his life owned by his spouse, if these policies are to
ultimately become a part of a Fruehauf trust. Until this area is resolved,
this is the only safe course of estate planning to take when faced with
life insurance trusts.
TH oMAs R. CRAWFORD
Federal Estate Taxation-Revenue Ruling 67-463 Has Been Dealt
A Grave Injustice
As the smoke clears from the aftermath of the decision of First Na-
tional Bank (of Midland) v. United States,1 we find that the Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service has once again met defeat. The score now
stands: taxpayers, three, the Commissioner and Revenue Ruling 67-463,
zero.' Completely realizing the possible adverse consequences to taxpayers
and estate tax planners, it will be shown, nevertheless, that the Commis-
sioner has been dealt a grave injustice.
Several years ago the Commissioner decided to review the estate tax
consequences of gifts of life insurance in situations where the deceased-
insured paid part of the premiums in contemplation of death, but had given
away all incidents of ownership in the policy more than three years prior
to death.3 To determine the amount to be included in the decedent's
gross estate the Commissioner issued Revenue Ruling 67-463:
"1In fact, the surviving spouse should never be designated as trustee over the
insurance trust since many states have provisions providing that a trustee has
certain broad powers, such as the power to sell, even though not specifically granted
by the trust instrument.
'423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
'Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 327.
'For example, decedent took out a fifty thousand dollar face amount policy on
his life six years before death. He paid all six thousand dollars of the premiums
(one thousand dollars annually), with one-half (three thousand dollars) of the
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A decedent, within three years of death and in contemplation of
death, paid the premiums on a policy of insurance on his life. He had
transferred the incidents of ownership in the policy to his wife more
than three years prior to his death. Held, such payment was a transfer
of an interest in the policy measured by the proportion the amount of
premiums so paid bears to the amount of premiums paid. Accordingly,
the value of the proportionate part of the amount receivable as insurance
that is attributable to those premiums paid by the decedent within three
years of death is includable in his gross estate under section 2035 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This conclusion is also applicable
where the wife originally applied for the insurance.4
The Commissioner's first setback with regard to Revenue Ruling 67-
463 came in 1968 in Gorman v. United States,5 in which the life insurance
company issued a policy on the decedent's life that designated his wife as
beneficiary and owner of all rights and privileges.6 In procuring the
insurance, the insured had requested that the policy be so written. The
policy was issued, and the insured paid the first and, as it turned out, the
only premium. Less than one year later the decedent-insured died. The
district director of the Internal Revenue Service sought to- include the
proceeds of the policy in decedent's gross estate,7 arguing that the de-
cedent's procurement of the policy or his payment of the premiums
amounted to a gift in contemplation of death within the meaning of section
2035 of the Internal Revenue Code.8 Plaintiff, decedent's wife and
premiums being paid within three years of his death. When he took out the policy
initially, he immediately transferred all the incidents of ownership to the bene-
ficiaries. It is conceded that the last three premium payments were made in con-
templation of death.
' Rev. Rul. 67-463M. Under this revenue ruling, in the example set forth in note
3 supra, the inclusion would be twenty-five thousand dollars because one-half of
the premims were paid in contemplation, and one-half of the face amount equals
twenty-five thousand dollars. Under the ruling the same result would be reached
even if the beneficiaries or donees originally applied for the policy on the life of the
decedent.
288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
0 Id. at 236.
7 Id. at 234-35.
' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035, states:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in contemplation
of his death.
(b) APPLICATION OF GENERAL RULE.-If the decedent within a period of 3
years ending with the date of his death (except in case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) transferred an interest
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executrix under his will, paid the tax and sued for refund. The district
court held that the premium was paid in contemplation of death but that
the amount to be included in the decedent's gross estate was only the actual
cash premium paid and not the pro rata amount of the proceeds."
In December of 1968, the Commissoner temporarily found reason to
rejoice. In First National Bank (of Midland) v. United States,'° also a
refund suit, the United States District Court upheld Revenue Ruling 67-
463.11 In this case the decedent and his wife purchased two life insurance
policies on decedent's life, one for each of their daughters. The daughters
were named as the owners of the policy and held all the incidents of
ownership in their respective policies. The premium payments, including
three in contemplation of death,"2 were made with community property
funds. A portion of the proceeds of the two policies were included in the
decedent's gross estate under section 2035. The court did not discuss prior
case law or legislative history but merely cited Revenue Ruling 67-463 as
the basis for its decision.' 3 The Commissioner's apparent victory was
swept aside when the fifth circuit reversed the district court on March 23,
1970.1 The court of appeals relied on the Gorman case and Estate of
Coleman'5 discussed below.
The Tax Court was faced with this issue for the first time in 1969. A
full court review dealt the Commissioner another defeat. In Coleman the
decedent's three children purchased, as record owners and beneficiaries, an
insurance policy on the decedent's life. The decedent had paid all the
premiums, and it was admitted that several premiums were paid in con-
templation of death. The government contended that the amount to be
included in the gross estate was "that part of the total proceeds which bears
in property, relinquished a power, or exercised or released a general power of
appointment, such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release shall, unless shown
to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the
meaning of this section and sections 2038 and 2041 (relating to revocable transfers
and powers of appointment); but no such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or
release made before such 3-year period shall be treated as having been made in
contemplation of death.
The purpose of section 2035 is to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions
and thus prevent evasion of the estate tax.
'288 F. Supp. at 234.
" 69-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 12,574 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 1968).
"Id. 12,574, at 84,831.
"Id. The plaintiffs made no effort to disavow the presumption that the premiums
were made in contemplation of death.
'a Id.
"423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
1052 T.C. 921 (1969).
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the same proportion to the total proceeds as the premiums paid in con-
templation of death bear to the total premiums paid."'-6 The court held
that the amount includable in the gross estate was limited to the premiums
paid in contemplation of death.'
Even though the Commissioner has lost three cases, he has not and
probably will not concede defeat at the moment because the opinions in the
three decided cases have been far from convincing and well-reasoned. In
Gorman the court began its attack on the Commissioner's position by re-
lating the legislative history of section 2042.8 The court reasoned that
the deletion of the "premium payment test" in section 2042 indicated a
congressional intent to prohibit any inclusion of policy proceeds in an
insured's estate based on the insured's payment of premiums.'" The court
decided that to allow the IRS to use a premium-based test to include part
of the proceeds of life insurance-even in valuing a transfer in contempla-
tion of death under section 2035-would effectively defeat the con-
gressional policy evidenced by the changes in section 2042." The court
felt that Revenue Ruling 67-463 was an administrative attempt to adopt
in part the premium payment test, which was deleted from the revenue laws
by the enactment of the 1954 Code.2 '
In so reasoning the court seems to have adopted an unnecessarily
broad interpretation of the 1954 changes. Congress rejected the "payment
of premiums" test as too harsh a basis for inclusion of insurance proceeds
in the taxable estate under section 2042 but gave no indication that it
intended to make payments of premiums irrelevant to taxation under other
sections of the federal estate tax.2 The majority of the House Ways and
Means Committee indicated that "payment of premiums is no longer a
factor in determining the tax liability under this section (section 2042)
of insurance proceeds."' Thus the court failed to distinguish between
"payment of premiums" as an independent basis for inclusion under
section 2042, a basis that had been deleted from the Code in 1954, and
the payment of a premium as a transfer made in contemplation of death
'1 Id. at 922. The government relied on Rev. Rul. 67-463.
17 Id. at 924.
1" 288 F. Supp. at 227-28. See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2042. This section deals
with the rules governing the includibility of proceeds of life insurance when the
insured retains "incidents of ownership."
1 288 F. Supp. at 227-28.
0 Id.
1Id. at 227.
'2 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A316-17 (1954).
21Id. at A316 (emphasis added).
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under section 2035.24 It must be re-emphasized that in Gorman, as well
as in First National Bank (of Midland) and Coleman, the courts were
concerned only with a section 2035 inclusion and not with a section 2042.2"
The next problem in the Gorman decision concerns the court's view
as to what constitutes a "transfer" under section 2035.28 The court stated
that
[t]he specific interpretative issue is what is the value of the property
transferred by the decedent . . .when he pays in contemplation of
death directly or indirectly premiums on a life insurance policy.27
The court decided that once it has been determined that an interest in
property has been transferred in contemplation of death, the amount in-
cluded in decedent's gross estate is the value of the interest transferred as
of the applicable valuation date.2" The court stated that "our focus must
at all times be directed to what was in fact transferred by the decedent
when he paid a premium in contemplation of death." 29 The court then
relied on the "specific asset theory"30 and decided that if anything were
to be included in the gross estate, "it should be limited to the value of
the asset transferred, namely the premium." 3' 1 Thus the court in Gorman
failed to come to grips with the issue to what constitutes a "transfer."
The government asserted that the procurement of the insurance policy
by the decedent for his wife was a "transfer" of the policy within the
meaning of section 203512 and that the total proceeds from the policy, as
a result of payment of the premium, is includable in the estate of the
decedent. The government cites Chase National Bank v. United States3
",The government argued that the conclusion reached by the ruling is actually
consistent with the intent of Congress in dropping the premium payment test from
the code because it places life insurance on an equal footing with other property.
" See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2042; Treas. Reg. § 20-2042 (1954).
2 288 F. Supp. at 228.
27Id.
28Id. See Treas. Reg. § 20-2035-1(e), T.D. 6501.
2 288 F. Supp. at 230-31. The court's discussion fails to shed light on the prob-
lem.
30 Id. at 233.
81.1d.
1
2 Id. at 226.
--278 U.S. 327 (1929). The decedent purchased three policies payable to his
wife as beneficiary. He reserved the right to change the beneficiary and to sur-
render the policies. After his death, his executor contended that there was no
transfer because the proceeds did not come directly from the decedent but instead
came from the insurer. The Supreme Court refused to accept this distinction and
reasoned that because of his retained rights, the decedent until his death retained
a legal interest in the policy, which effectively gave him a power of disposition
over the proceeds. The Court concluded that the termination of such power was
[Vol. 49
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in support of its view. The government contended that even though
ownership in the policy was created in the wife, the transaction itself was
really a transfer by the decedent of those rights since he was the one who
provided the consideration or motivating force for the transaction. The
insured was the master of his offer and the transferor of the policy when
he made application to the insurance company and decided to have the
company's "bargained for promise" run to his wife." This position is
appealing since the law should not distinguish between the situation where
A pays B to give something to C and the situation where A purchases
the thing and makes a gift of it to C. 5 The court in Gorman, however,
dismissed the argument by noting that the Supreme Court in Chase never
considered the relationship of premiums to proceeds. 6 In so doing, the
court simply avoided the fact that the procurement of the policy itself
may have been a transfer in contemplation of death. Inclusion of a gift
under section 2035 should not be affected by the fact that, at the time
of the transfer, the decedent immediately and absolutely parted with the
enjoyment of or title to the property.3  As stated in United States v.
W/ells: 
8
a constitutionally taxable transfer and need not have been preceded directly by a
transfer from the decedent to the recipient of his bounty. It thought the word
"transfer" should not be restricted to direct transfers, but should "at least include
the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the decedent with pur-
pose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another." Id. at 337.
" See Simmons, District Court invalidates IRS' three-year premium payment
rule, 29 J. TAX. 338, 339 (1968).
" See generally Note, Inclusion of Insurance Proceeds Because of the Decedent's
Continuous Premium Paynent-The Continued Validity of Revenue Ruling 67-463,
64 Nw. U.L. REv. 116 (1969). Under section 2035 if A transfers one hundred
dollars in cash to B in contemplation of death only one hundred dollars will be in-
cluded in A's gross estate. However, if A transfers a piece of real property in
contemplation with a fair market value of one hundred dollars, and when A dies
the property has a fair market value (FMV) of one thousand dollars, one
thousand dollars is included in A's gross estate. What if A, in contemplation of
death, gives X one hundred dollars and tells him to buy a certain piece of real
property and give it to B. If this piece of property has FMV of one thousand
dollars when A dies, surely no one would doubt that the amount to be included
should be one thousand dollars. This same type of analysis should be applied in the
life insurance situation being discussed. See 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 327, 328, which
states that:
[A] premium payment under a contract of life insurance by other than the
owner of the policy is analogous to a gift of specific property by the donor to
the owner. Unlike the unrestricted gift of money a premium payment is a gift
of insurance protection, a transfer of an interest in the policy which is trans-
muted at death into the proceeds of the policy.
288 F. Supp. at 228.
'T Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(a), T.D. 6501."283 U.S. 102 (1931).
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[t]he quality which brings the transfer within the statute is indicated
by the context and manifest purpose. Transfers in contemplation of
death are included within the same category... with transfers intended
to take effect at or after the death of the transferor. The dominant pur-
pose is to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions and thus to
prevent evasion of the estate tax.s 9
Thus, the Chase notion is that the decedent need not transmit property
directly to the recipient to be viewed as the "transferor" within the mean-
ing of section 2035. The actions of the insured in Gorman could well be
viewed as equivalent to a "transfer" of the policy. Certainly, the transaction
in Gorman is not functionally distinguishable from a situation where the
policy was originally issued in the decedent's own name and then trans-
ferred to the wife immediately. ° It should be remembered that while the
insurer created the policy rights solely in the decedent's wife, it did so
only at decedent's request and because of the consideration supplied by
him.
Furthermore, the court in Gorman did not adequately consider whether,
by paying the premiums, the decedent made a transfer of a pro rata
share of the proceeds to his wife. To advance this view, the government
relied on Liebmann v. Hassett.41 The court, however, distinguished
Liebmann (and thereby evaded the issue) by saying:
Liebmann . . . is not authority for the proposition that payment of
premiums transfer an interest in an insurance policy in the absence of
1 a provision such as section 302(g) .. .As clearly indicated ... the
court relied on section 302(g) ... to equate the payment of premiums
by the decedent's wife to an addition or improvement made by her to the
Id. at 116-17.See Note, Inheritance and Estate Taxes-Insurance Policies-Premiiums Paid
in Contemplation of Death Held Taxable to the Estate of the Insured Only to the
Extent of the Amount Paid, 82 HIARv. L. Rnv. 1765, 1767 (1969); Note, Federal
Taxation-Section 2035, Internal Revenue Code of 1954-Life Insurance Proceeds
-Revenue Ride 67-463, 43 Tm. L. REv. 882, 892-93 (1969).
" 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945). The decedent transferred a life insurance policy
to his wife in December, 1935, and died in October, 1937. After the transfer, the
wife paid the two annual premiums. The wife stipulated that the policy was trans-
ferred in contemplation of death. The court decided that the interest transferred
was to be valued at the date of death. To determine the value, the court turned to
section 302 g (INT. REV. CODE of 1926, § 30 2 (g) ) which made life insurance payable
to the named beneficiary includible to the extent that it was "taken out' by the
decedent. The court excluded that part of the proceeds which were "purchased"
by the last two premiums paid by the wife.
[Vol. 49
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property transferred in an amount equal to a pro rata amount of the
proceeds.4
Thus, the court in Gorman concluded that it was only the existence of
section 30 2 (g) that resulted in its conclusion that there was a transfer
of a pro rata share of the proceeds. 43 Since the court found no necessary
relationship between the payment of premiums and the proceeds of the
policy, it was unable to see how the decedent could be characterized as
the motivating force behind the proceeds payment. The court concluded
that any and all rights to the proceeds came from the contract with the
insured, not from the payment of premiums.44 The court has failed to
look through form to substance.
In essence, the court in Gorman held that the payment of premiums by
a nonowner of a policy was not in any sense a transfer of an interest in
the policy or any of the contractual rights of that policy. Since in the
court's view only a transfer of these contractual rights would dictate the
inclusion of the proceeds of the policy in the gross estate, only the amount
of the premium was so included. "This analysis has the apparent virtue of
turning upon a transfer that was actually made: the husband's payment of
the premium."45 However, the court's analysis would seem to be correct
only if the premium payment were to be valued at the time of transfer
rather than at the insured's death. With the exception of cash transfers, 48
property transferred in contemplation of death is valued as of the date of
the transferor's death and not at the time of the transfer.' Since other
transfers, such as those of stocks and real property, are valued in the
taxable estate at the time of the donor's death, consistency dictates that
insurance be similarly treated. 8
As indicated, the problem is how to value a premium when the valuatio,
is made at the time of the insured's death and the beneficiary has become
entitled to the proceeds of the policy. The valuation favored by the court
in Gorman is incorrect. The premiums are the consideration furnished
for the insurance company's promise to pay the proceeds at the donor's
death. When the donor pays the premium, he is not merely giving the
"288 F. Supp. at 229-30. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e), T.D. 6501.
288 F. Supp. at 229-30.
"Id.
"Note, 82 HA.v. L. REv., supra note 40, at 1768.
Cf. Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947).
"See Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e), T.D. 6501.
" See generally Note, 82 HARv. L. Rzv., supra note 40.
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amount of the premium; his purpose is to insure that the contractual
benefits will be received by the beneficiary. Revenue Ruling 67-463
more clearly reflects the values that were actually transferred. This
ruling does not re-establish the old payment of premiums inclusion as only
the values transferred in the three years preceding the insured's death can
be included in the estate under section 2035. Thus, if the insured had
paid no premium and had no interest within the three years, none of the
proceeds of the policy could be included in the taxable estate.
The court of appeals in First National Bank (of Midland) failed to
shed any light on the controversy, and simply relied on Gorman and
Coleman to reach its decision. The court stated that "[w] e are not dealing
with a case in which the policy itself was transferred."4 As pointed out
earlier and re-emphasized in the discussion below in Coleman, this is a
dubious distinction.50 The court rejected the government's claim that
payment of life insurance premiums by decedent on policies owned by
his daughters, transferred "insurance benefits" to them for federal estate
tax purposes. The government acknowledged that the value of the de-
cedent's payments at the time they were made was their dollar value; how-
ever, the government explained that the "property or interest in property"
actually transferred to the daughters through the agency of the insurance
company, was not the cash amount of premium payments, but a "bundle
of rights" under the insurance contract. The government concluded that
the decedent made a transfer of rights in the same way that a purchaser of
real property in the daughters' names would transfer the property to them
rather than the consideration paid for it.51 The daughters therefore re-
ceived insurance benefits, not cash, and the payment of the premiums pro-
duced the proceeds. The court, relying on Gorman and Coleman, re-
jected the government's argument. 2 The government's argument in
Gorman and Coleman are equally applicable to the First National Bank
(of Midland) decision.
The majority opinion in Coleman displays on its face the weaknesses
of its arguments. The court stated:
Section 2035, -by its terms, applies only to a "transfer" of an interest
in property by a decedent. In Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 C.B. 327,
,9 423 F.2d at 1287.
50 See examples in note 35 supra.
51423 F.2d at 1287-88.
Id. at 1288.
[Vol. 49
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respondent decreed that the mere payment of premiums operated as a
transfer of an interest in the proceeds of insurance-in this case, by
the decedent to the children. We disagree.
If the decedent had purchased a life insurance policy, initially re-
taining the ownership in herself, and thereafter assigned it to her
children, there clearly would have been a "transfer" of an interest in the
policy.53
In essence the majority holds that if the insured takes out an insurance
policy on his own life, then transfers it to the beneficiary and continues to
pay all the premiums, this is a transfer. But, if the beneficiary/owner takes
out the policy initially on the insured (as in Coleman), even though the
insured procures the policy-negotiates for the policy, takes the medical
exams, pays the premium- this is a different situation and therefore not
a transfer. The court makes one factual element- who first took out the
policy-the crucial factor as to whether there is a transfer. 54 Obviously,
the majority does not come to grips with the Commissioner's argument
for inclusion of a proportionate part of the proceeds. Instead, the majority
makes matters hinge upon pure formalism, a matter of no meaningful
substance to wit: Did decedent, after taking the medical exam and paying
the first premium, have the policy run to her and then at once transfer it
to her children; or, did decedent, after taking the medical exam and paying
the first premium, have the insurance agent draw the policy with it
running directly to her children? Surely, there should be no substantive
difference in the two situations.
In Chase, relied on by the Commissioner, the court gave the proper
interpretation and scope to the term "transfer."
Obviously, the word "transfer" in the statute, or the privilege which
may constitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken in such a restricted sense
as to refer only to the passing of particular items of property directly
from the decedent to the transferee. It must, we think, at least include
the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the decedent
with the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another.
Sec. 402(c) taxes transfers made in contemplation of death. It would
not, we assume, be seriously argued that its provisions could be evaded
by the purchase by a decedent from a third person of property, a savings
bank book for example, and its delivery by the seller directly to the
52 T.C. at 923.
"Id. at 927-28 (Raum, J., dissenting).
1971]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
intended beneficiary on the purchaser's death, or that the measure of
the tax would be the cost and not the value or proceeds at the time of
death.55
The majority in Coleman chose not to follow the substantive approach
of the Court in Chase and applied a formal, restrictive definition of trans-
fer, however, there were three well-reasoned dissents. 0 One of the
dissenters relied on the above quoted passage from Chase and then neatly
turned the majority's narrow formalism back upon it.57 He did this by
pointing out how strange it is to include only the amount of cash expended
in contemplation of death because that cash was never transferred as such
to the children. If "transfer," as the majority indicated, means that a
particular form of property must leave the decedent and arrive in that
same form in the hands of the beneficiary, then there was no more a
"transfer" of the cash than there was of the insurance proceeds. " This
same dissenter stated:
The real question is how to value that transfer. I think it should be
valued at what the amounts paid as premiums purchased in the way of
insurance protection and not at what was actually paid for that pro-
tection.59
Another dissenter summed up the failure of the majority viewpoint:
It seems to me that the majority opinion fans the flickering flame
of form. The legal and economic substance is indeed interred. Too
much emphasis is placed on formalities. Certainly the decedent had an
"interest" in the insurance policy on her life. Granted that her children
were "the record owners and beneficiaries," it was the decedent who
actually purchased the policy.0
There are several other considerations that must be pointed out con-
cerning Revenue Ruling 67-463. It should be emphasized that none of
the cited cases has provided an answer to the valuation problem where
the decedent initially took ownership of the policy and then transferred all
ownership to beneficiaries more than three years before death, but con-
278 U.S. at 337 (emphasis added).
" 52 T.C. 926-28 (dissenting opinions).
" Id. at 926-27 (Tietjens, J., dissenting).
rs Id.
Id. at 926.'0 Id. at 928 (Dawson, J., dissenting).
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tinued to pay the premiums. The cases went no further than recognizing
that this was a transfer. Revenue Ruling 67-463 does provide an answer.
Therefore, estate planners should be aware that the ruling in this respect
has not been rejected and should be considered when planning estates.61
In addition to the strong arguments supporting the Commissioner's
view, there is one additional consideration that would dictate the adoption
of Revenue Ruling 67-463. If this ruling is not accepted certain in-
equalities will actually ensue. Consider the man who cannot obtain life
insurance because of age or medical history. He cannot benefit from the
Coleman rule. For example, if he desires to give real property to his
family as a source of income after he dies, and he does so in contemplation
of death, the value of the property at his death would be included in his
gross estate. If the property has increased in value, his estate tax burden
will also be increased. Under the Coleman situation, the man who is
insurable has a definite advantage. He can acquire an insurance policy with
the beneficiaries as initial owners, guaranteeing the payment of proceeds
far greater than his paid-in premiums, and will suffer an estate tax in-
clusion of only the amount of the actual cash premiums paid in contempla-
tion of death. Therefore, for the same dollar outlay and the same ultimate
values transferred, the insurable transferor will be able to transfer to his
family an increased amount of values by virtue of the lower estate tax cost.
Unless the revenue ruling is accepted, insurance will not be on the same
footing as all other property. Indeed, values passing by insurance will
receive more favorable tax treatment than all other forms of property
transmitted at death.
The decisions thus far on Revenue Ruling 67-463 amass a "mixed-
bag" of reasoning and create artificial distinctions. Realizing this, the
Commissioner is unlikely to give up. As a federal tax system must deal
in economic realties, the word "transferor" should be read to include those
persons who provide the consideration for a transfer. As one authority has
noted:
" For estate tax planners, it should be noted that the commissioner is still free
to insist upon the larger inclusion as set out in the ruling although he has lost the
three mentioned cases. As far as we here in the fourth circuit are concerned, we
must cope with the ruling until such time as this circuit has a court of appeals
decision on the matter. While it is true that the Revenue Act of 1969 made the
Tax Court a constitutional court, this does not mean that the Tax Court is bound
in all later cases by the decision of a single circuit court of appeals. Instead, the
present state of affairs is that the Tax Court is bound in later cases only by court
of appeals decisions involving cases in that particular circuit. Jack E. Golson, 54
T.C. 742 (1970).
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It seems reasonably clear that, if I direct my broker to purchase 100
shares of xyz stock in the name of my son and I pay the purchase
price, I have transferred 100 shares of xyz stock, not the dollars paid.
2
If a decedent seeks out the insurer, negotiates all the terms of the policy,
requests the insurer to create all the policy rights in another, and pays the
first premium which actually brings the contractual rights, as evidenced
by the policy issued, into existence, to say that this is not a "transfer" by
the decedent is to put form over substance. If the decedent continues to
pay the premiums, he remains the motivating force of the transaction, at
least with respect to the amount of proceeds attributable to the premium
payments within three years of his death. The premium was paid to the
insurer to purchase an asset-the asset being the insurer's promise to pay
the policy proceeds on the death of the insured. Inherent in life insurance
is the fact that the value of the company's promise to pay is always in-
creasing in value as death draws nearer. The decedent's payment to the
insurer is prompted by the knowledge that this manner of payment will
assure him of getting something more for his money, i.e., a benefit to the
donee greater than the dollars paid for the premium payment, in the form
of insurance proceeds in excess of the money paid.
On balance, the pro rata valuation (the Revenue Ruling's procedure
for valuation) seems to be the method which best carries out the
prior policies and decisions regarding the taxation of gifts in contempla-
tion of death. It takes cognizance of the donor's intent in paying the
premiums and does not violate the congressional intent that underlays
the amendments to section 2042.3
MICHAEL DONWELL GUNTER
Insurance-Life Insurance Applications: Opinion Answers or
Material Misrepresentations
With its recent decision in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v.
Barden,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit may have demon-
strated that the converse of the time-worn judicial apology, "hard cases
make bad law," is not necessarily true. Beneath Barden's deceptively
6 Stephens, The Clifford Shadow over the Federal Estate Tax, 4 GA. L. REv.
233, 243 (1970).
" See Note, 82 HAnv. L. Rxv., supra note 40, at 1771.
1424 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1970).
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